IF HAMILTON AND MADISON WERE MERELY LUCKY , WHAT HOPE IS THERE FOR RUSSIAN FEDERALISM ?

Abstrac t
Just as the two-headed eagle of imperial and contemporary Russia looks in two differen t directions, this essay has two objectives : to evaluate, on the basis of the American experience , the prospects for stable democratic federalism in Russia, and to reconsider the insights int o federalism offered by Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist . The swirl of events in Russi a make it difficult if not impossible to confidently render conclusions about the future directio n of events and the prospects for meaningful federal domestic relations . However, som e theoretical perspective can be gained by looking at the theory of federalism offered in The Federalist Papers, with special attention to Madison and Hamilton's failure to appreciate full y the role political parties would play in the eventual integration of American political institution s so as to establish, in Madison's words, a "properly structured" federation . Looking as well a t the early history of parties in the U .S . we see, in addition to the usual constitutional provision s associated with federalism, the importance of those things that structure political competitio n within states . Properly designed . these things encourage the development of political partie s that mirror federal relations, and integrate regional and national political elites so as to aver t center-periphery conflict . Unfortunately, a review of the provisions currently in place fo r Russia reveals that electoral practices and regional and republic constitutions and proposals ar e unlikely to encourage parties of the sort that facilitate a stable federal system . This fact, i n conjunction with several other trends (notably, corruption and the political instincts of politica l elites in Moscow) lead to the conclusion that a "federation" of the type currently observed in , say, Mexico is a better scenario of the future for Russia than is a federation that imitates the U .S ., Australia, Germany, or Switzerland . '
. Introductio n
In December 1993 . Russian voters ratified a constitution that ostensibly established a democratic federal state . However, it is not yet clear whether that document will move Russi a in the direction of its stated objective or whether it merely provides a democratic gloss to a 1 new authoritarian regime, albeit one with a capitalist foundation . Political parties, all born an d bred in Moscow, are precarious entities that rise and fall with the fortunes of specifi c personalities (Fish 1995, Remington and Smith 1995) . Federal relations remain a struggl e between Moscow and Russia's regions and republics over revenue, resources, and polic y (Wallich 1994) . And official interpretations of democracy, including interpretations of a separation of powers and federalism, are suspiciously reminiscent of the comfortable traditio n of democratic centralism . Thus, it is not unreasonable to ask : will Russia become a democrati c federal state like the United States, Australia, Switzerland, or Germany ; a quasi-federal one like Mexico ruled by a single party fed by official corruption ; a democratic unitary one lik e France or Costa Rica ; or a federalism like Nigeria that intersperses military dictatorship with democratic process ?
The answer to this question cannot be found in any survey of Russia's curren t circumstances alone . The swirl of events there lead in too many contradictory directions . O n the one hand, we see a political system permeated by corruption in which competing " clans " vie for control of Russia 's resources while exhibiting little interest in investing in a moribun d economy .' On the other hand we find a Constitutional Court that has just begun to operate i n an environment in which there appears to be considerable demand for an arbiter of conflic t among those clans and among the varied parts of government . Economic reform proceed s fruitfully in some regions, whereas in others, circumstances are not much different than a decade ago.' And although mass elections have gained ascendancy as a way to legitimize political leadership, arrangements are being fashioned that would allow even greater manipulation of election outcomes than is alleged to have occurred in 1993 . 4
To make sense of these contradictions requires some theoretical perspective . That is, to assess the interplay of these contradictory processes requires a general understanding of wh y some federal states are successful and others are not, of Russia's deficiencies in this respect, o f the tools of political institutional design that might remedy these deficiencies, and of th e likelihood that those tools will be used . For this we turn to what seems an unusual sourc e insofar as our subject matter is Russia : The Federalist Papers . We do this not only because th e United States has achieved what seems to be Russia ' s contemporary goal --a viable, balanced , democratic federalism --but also because, in setting forth the constitutional prerequisites for achieving a balance between a national government whose laws are supreme but which i s protective of the legitimate autonomy of its states --the twin objectives that currently bedevi l the creation of a democratic federal Russia --Madison and Hamilton offer a blueprint for ho w constitutional parameters could be shaped to reach such an outcome .
2
The circumstances Madison and Hamilton confronted were, of course, wholly differen t from those that confront Russians . Among those differences is the fact that states in 1787 wer e entities with functioning governments that possessed significant if not complete autonomy ; i t was a national government that the new constitution sought to empower . Russia' s circumstances are the opposite . Except for the ethnic republics that have wrested som e autonomy from the center . Russia's 68 or so non-ethnic regions (oblasts, krais, autonomou s okrugs) are largely administrative subparts of the national government that have not ye t secured a clear constitutional role . Thus, although Hamilton and Madison were concerned wit h assuring states (and delegates to the New York ratification convention) that the new federa l government would not usurp their legitimate authority, Russia must find a way to empower it s federal subjects without threatening the dismemberment of the country .
Despite this difference, the central issue addressed by The Federalist concerns Russia a s much as it did the United States : how to avoid having relations among the separate levels of government become an n+1 person conflictual game in which then federal subjects (states ) are pitted against each other and the national government, and how to sustain an equilibriu m that allows society to realize the benefits of federal decentralization in some natural way . How , that is, states can be made "constituent parts of the national sovereignty " (Federalist #9) in which decisions about the legitimate authority of one level of government or the other are th e product of "normal " politics .
The words of The Federalist have been widely translated and read, no less in Russia tha n elsewhere, and were those words a complete blueprint for democratic federal design, our tas k would be done . However, Madison and Hamilton's theory about how a federal equilibrium i s maintained is incomplete . The Federalist accepts the view of parties that prevailed at that time , and by equating them with factions and as things to be controlled, it focuses on a narrow rang e of constitutional parameters that would facilitate such control --separations of power . representation in the national legislature, bicameralism . and allocations of policy jurisdictions .
But because they failed to see how national and local parties would operate symbiotically t o breath life into constitutional institutions so as to implement a balance between federa l supremacy and regional autonomy --as the things that would mobilize people to political actio n under the rules set by the constitution --Madison and Hamilton failed to anticipate fully th e influence on federalism of a different set of institutional parameters, those dealing directly o r indirectly with national election laws, the role of state and local elections, and the character o f state governments .
Given their limited objectives (securing ratification of a new national constitution whe n arguably a majority opposed it) Madison and Hamilton's genius was marrying rhetoric an d practicality to theories drawn from the Enlightenment in a way that made a series of newspape r essays required reading for generations to come . Their failure to appreciate the role of partie s and the constitutional provisions that would directly or indirectly influence that role, might lea d to the conclusion that they (and we) were merely lucky --that the Constitution "worked" fo r reasons other than the ones Madison and Hamilton offer . Fortunately, states in the new republic began the "game" with institutions and powers that encouraged parties of the righ t sort, and that arguably allowed for greater flexibility in the constitutional forms that woul d prove to be successful . Thus, the combination of what was provided for in the U .S.
Constitution and the formal and informal institutions that preceded it facilitated the development of a party system that integrated federal and state governments and allowed the establishment of a viable federation .
Despite these advantages, it took the Civil War to resolve the issues of slavery and th e supremacy of federal law . Russia must operate in an environment that is even less forgiving than the one America confronted in 1787 or 1860 . Burdened by the legacy of a n administratively centralized state, and more poorly endowed with democratic traditions , decision makers there continue to focus on simple ad hoc command-and-control expedients , such as bilateral treaties between the Kremlin and federal subjects . And although they hav e learned the importance of the constitutional parameters discussed by Hamilton and Madison , they fail to understand the context in which those parameters were set . The crafting of regiona l constitutions, as part of the power struggle between center and periphery, is seen as part of th e Kremlin's attempt to serve the old interest of centralized administrative control . And althoug h discussions of election laws take the same form as they do nearly everywhere else --the y focus, naturally enough, on how best to serve the immediate self-interest of those who woul d design them --Russia hasn't the luxury of divorcing that discussion from an assessment o f their impact on federalism . There are, then, good reasons for believing that Russia is makin g some fundamental errors of political institutional design .
. The Incomplete Theory of The Federalist s
Without trying to distinguish between what was written merely as political rhetoric versu s things said as part of a coherent theory of political institutional design, Madison and Hamilto n offer two cures for the instabilities that characterized earlier republics : an extended republi c and a properly structured federalism :
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a Republica n remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government (Federalist #10) .
The first of these cures, the extended republic, need not concern us, since if that argumen t applied in 1787-8, it applies with special force to Russia . If anything, Russia's size an d diversity compel us to seek a clearer understanding of the meaning of " proper structure" tha n was required even of the Framers of the U .S . Constitution. Unfortunately, Madison an d
Hamilton's definition or outline of a proper structure is vague and incomplefe . There are , though, several components of political institutional design that seem essential . First amon g these is a tripartite, balanced separation of powers, and there is little doubt that Madison and Hamilton saw the necessity for applying this principle to state governments as well as th e national one :
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is firs t divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each , subdivided among distinct and separate departments . Hence, a double security arises to the rights of the people . The different governments will control each other ; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself (Federalist #51) .
A balanced separation is a virtual axiom of The Federalist for achieving a stable republica n government. But insofar as this axiom is directed primarily at safeguarding individual rights . • State representation in a meaningful upper legislative chamber of the nationa l government. Because constitutional prohibitions of federal excess are unlikely to be mor e than mere "parchment barriers," states require the additional protection of explici t representation in the Senate .
Hamilton, in fact, virtually equates these two requirements with the definition of prope r sfructure :
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the Stat e Governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty by allowin g them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain elusive and very important portions of sovereign power . This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a Federal Governmen t (Federalist #9) .
Representation in the Senate was, of course, the cornerstone of the Great Compromis e whereby small states were empowered to protect their interests against the larger ones . But, in adhering to the demands of the more populous states, the U .S . Constitution gives states a dua l protection :
• In addition to seeing the Senate as representing states and the House as more responsiv e to "the people generally," The Federalist identifies both chambers as giving the state s representation --small states in the case of the Senate, large ones in the case of th e House . Madison's caveat that the lower chamber be sufficiently large to ensure meaningful representation but not too large emphasizes the local character to the intende d structure of representation :
after securing a sufficient number for purposes of safety, of loca l information, and of diffuse sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own view by every addition to their representatives (Federalist #58, emphasis in the original) .
Although Hamilton and Madison's arguments here are colored by more than a littl e political rhetoric, the general principle hinted at bears emphasis . Specifically, both chambers o f the U .S . Congress (like both chambers of the German, Swiss, and Australian parliaments) giv e explicit representation to the states, and thus both chambers, at least in theory, provide state s with some degree of protection . In the U .S . and Australia, this is accomplished in the lowe r 6 chamber by single-member districts contained wholly in each state ; Switzerland implements proportional representation at the canton level, and in Germany it is accomplished by havin g parties fill seats in the Bundestag by both single-member districts and by party lists generate d within each lander. The Swiss and German systems are, perhaps, more explicitly "federal" i n the way they fill their lower legislative chambers, and although the U .S . House of representatives is not designed to represent states per se, to the extent that state interests are a n aggregation of local interests, it performs this function . Finally ,
• Concurrent jurisdiction . Unlike a unitary state in which the central government is alone responsible to the people and merely assigns powers to federal subjects, and unlike a confederacy in which the federal government has no direct connection to the people .
proper structure requires that both the national government and state governments hav e their own direct connection to the ultimate sovereign . As Hamilton states the matter :
we
must resolve to incorporate into our plans those ingredients whic h may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens, --the only proper objects of governmen t (Federalist #15) .
And
The "Sovereignty, conceptualized as the authority to make laws, is divided so that th e people of the member republics are subordinate to the authority of the Union wit h respect to national affairs, but are independent with respect to those prerogative s that apply to the jurisdiction of the separate states or republics . The states, in turn . serve as constituent parts of the national government by their representation in the Senate . Governments do not govern governments as such . Concurrent government s reach to the persons of individuals, including citizens and officials claiming t o exercise governmental prerogatives under consfitutional authority . "
The emphasis here on states as "constituent parts" of the Union contrasts sharply with mos t contemporary treatments of federalism, including the approach taken today in Russia .
Academic treatments, especially ones offering formal assessments of public goods and the benefits of decentralization or ones debating the constitutional prerogatives of governments , typically conceptualize federalism as some n+l person game : n federal subjects versus the national government (see . for example, Aranson 1995 , Rapaczynski 1985 . There are good reasons for this view . If realizing the benefits of federalism requires a national government tha t has the constitutional authority to coerce all other governments in it to a common purpose, an d requires as well a constitutional rather than contingent decentralization of authority --a decentralization that cannot be defined exclusively by the national government --then the core design problem is to find a way to achieve an equilibrium of federal and state prerogatives . '
This view also predominates Russian perceptions of the management of federal relations .
Moscow's attitude toward the ethnic republics has not been much different than relation s between sovereign states : Bilateral treaties are negotiated between the Kremlin and republi c authorities that divide areas of responsibility and tax shares as though one side's gain is th e other's loss (Teague 1994 , Wallich 1994 . The non-ethnic regions, on the other hand, are see n as mere competitors for authority and control of Russia 's vast natural resources . Thus , manifested in an unwillingness even to allow for direct election of regional governors, th e Kremlin sees these regions more as subjects to be controlled than anything else .
Madison and Hamilton, though, saw a federation as a more integrated entity . Although their federation was to be a political system in which the evils of faction and threats to individual liberty were to be controlled by both a vertical and a horizontal separation o f powers, with federal and state governments simultaneously and directly answerable to the people and formally combined in the institution of the Senate, it was to be an integrated entit y There is, though, one glaring omission from Madison and Hamilton's account of th e properly structured federalism, and its absence allows them only an incomplete account of th e mechanisms whereby the people would implement their control over state and nationa l governments and the integration of federal and state governments that characterized prope r 8 structure . "The balance of social interests, the separation and balance of powers, were mean t to secure liberty, but it was still uncertain, after the instrument had been framed and ratified , whether the balance would not be too precarious to come to rest anywhere ; and whether the arms of government, separated in parchment, could come together in reality to cooperate in th e formation and execution of policy . . . a mechanism had to be found . . . by which men could put together what God, in the shape of the Constitution, had sundered" (Hofstadter, 1969, p . 70 ) .
Thaf mechanism is fhe political parfy .
Hamilton and Madison deemed parties and factions the same thing, and both were to b e controlled rather than made infegral parts of the political process : "The Fathers hoped to create not a system of party government under a constitution but rather a constitutional government that would check and control parties" (Hofstadter, 1969 : 53) . However, "in a country whic h was always to be in need of the cohesive force of institutions, the national parties, for all thei r faults, were to become at an early hour primary and necessary parts of the machinery o f government, essential vehicles to convey men's loyalties to the State" (Hofstadter, 1969 : 70-1) .
A constitution defines the institutional skeleton of government, but parties are the things tha t politicians erect to achieve their goals (notably reelection) under the rules defined by a constitution and, thus, they are the things that breathe life into constitutional provisions . Pu t simply, "political parties created modern democracy . . . and modern democracy is unthinkabl e save in terms of political parties " (Schattschneider 1941 : 1) .
The role of political parties in creating a modern democracy occurs in many ways, but their role is especially important in federal states . In William Riker's (1964 : 136) words , Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that sustain the federal bargain . there is one institutional condition that controls the nature of the bargain in al l instances here examined and in all others with which I am familiar . This is the structure of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variabl e intervening between the background social conditions and the specific nature of th e federal bargain .
What remains, then, is identification of those institutional structures, constitutional o r otherwise, that facilitate the formation of parties of the right sort --of parties that encourag e incentives for politicians to be protective of regional autonomy while simultaneously acceding to the supremacy of federal law . The American Civil War may warn us that we may be able to speak only of necessary but not sufficient conditions . Perhaps the economic interests associate d with slavery precluded the integration of governments that Madison and Hamilton sought , especially full acceptance of the supremacy of federal law .' But we now know the role partie s play in achieving that integration and we have some good ideas as to what influences the rol e and form of parties . It is these things to which we now turn . • Supremacy and secession (or nonsecession) ;
• regional courts ;
• Jurisdictional boundaries between the federal government and federal subjects ;
• Guarantees of the obligation of contracts, of free trade within the federation ; and o f democratic governance within federal subjects ;
• The admission of new federal subjects or alterations in the boundaries of existing ones :
• The role of federal subjects in amending the national constitution .
However, if Riker is correct, these provisions alone cannot define a properly structure d federalism . If parties play as profound a role as Riker and others suggest, then we need als o look at the following :
• The method of electing the president if the system is presidential ;
• The timing of elections ;
• Control over the methods of election to the national legislature as well as stat e legislatures ;
• The pervasiveness of elections as a means of filling national, federal subject, and loca l public offices ;
• The content of federal subject constitutions .
The first two items on this list, in combination with representation formulas for th e national legislature, are the usual ones thought of as influencing the number of parties and th e extent to which party leaders (especially in ethnicly divided states) act to moderate conflic t (Shugart and Carey 1992 , Taagepera and Shugart 1989 , Horowitz 1991 , Sartori 1994 . Thes e provisions alone, however, do not tell us much about regional party formation, the relationshi p between national and regional parties (especially the critical matter of regional parties that are organized merely to increase the salience of especially divisive ethnic or racial issues or t o undermine the authority of the national government), or the extent to which parties facilitat e viable federal relations .
Turning, then, to the remaining three items on this list, we can begin by noting that muc h of the early organized activities of "parties" in the Unifed States, both before and after the ratification of the Constitution, was directed at the manipulation of those election laws an d
procedures controlled by the states, especially apportionment and suffrage . Absent meaningfu l competition for the presidency (owing to Washington's hesitancy to reject running for a thir d
term and the near-consensus that the office was his for the asking throughout hi s administration), political competition, with but a few exceptions, focused on control of state legislatures, and, in some (but not all) states, control of the governorship and the patronage they controlled . For nearly fifty years popular attention in politics was absorbed in operatin g the local system, already 150 years old . Interest in the new federal politics developed wit h extreme deliberation " (Nichols, 1967 : p . 164 ) .
Considerable political activity focused on national issues --the Jay Treaty, the Alien an d
Sedition Acts, the debt, and the contest for the presidency in 1800 --but national parties, a s compared to state organizations, remained weak (and disappeared for a while), as witnessed b y the fact that national party conventions were unknown until the 1840's . State apportionment and suffrage laws were often key determinants of one party or faction's fortunes over another .
Absent each state's opportunity to manipulate such things, it is unlikely that we would hav e seen the accelerated development of state parties, the conversion of personality-based factions into standing organizations for the mobilization of voters, and, subsequently, the federalized , bottom-up development of national parties in the 1820's and 1830's as opposed to the top-dow n process we see in Russia today . Indeed, the salience of national issues, given the state' s authority to manipulate election procedures for federal office, contributed to this process .
Although some states proceeded directly to popular election of electors to the electoral colleg e and single-member district elections for the U .S . House of Representatives, others manipulate d these procedures with great frequency . For example, Massachusetts chose electors by popula r 1 1 vote in 1788, 1792 . and 1796, turned to legislative selection in 1800, returned to the popula r vote in 1804, back to legislative selection in 1808, returned once again to popular vote i n 1812, back again to legislative selection in 1816, and, finally, back to popular vote in 1820 .
New Jersey, Georgia, and North Carolina made almost as many changes, and only Marylan d
and Virginia began with a popular vote and stuck with it . Similarly, when electing members o f Congress, Pennsylvania began in 1788 with an at-large system (SNTV), changed to a distric t system in 1791, returned to the at large-system in 1792, and permanently changed to singlemember districts in 1794 (Hoadley 1986) . Maryland, demonstrating the same schizophrenia we see in Russia today, began with a splif system but changed to the district system in 1790 , whereas New Jersey began with SNTV, changed to a district system in 1798, returned t o SNTV in 1800, and changed subsequently and permanently to a district system . In all cases , these changes were governed by the fortunes of different factions or proto-parties within th e states, and the opportunity to implement such changes, like changes in apportionment an d suffrage, were part of the rewards encouraging state party formation .
Insofar as contemporary circumstances are concerned, there is, of course, some dispute over the extent to which federalism has eroded in the United States . We do not want to ente r that debate, aside from noting that although the federal government's share of publi c expenditures after World War II and the Korean War greatly exceeded that of state and loca l governments, the trend since then has been a return to the more nearly even balance tha t prevailed in the 1930's . Thus, although there are good arguments in favor of the view tha t erosion has been excessive, we cannot say that long-term trends point unambiguously in an y one direction . Parties, in the meantime, remain decentralized, and if we ask what keeps the m federalized --decentralized, yet vertically integrated --we must look still at electoral systems .
One of the most striking features of American political institutions, especially when w e compare them to an imperfectly formed federal state such as Russia, is our pervasive use o f elections . Indeed, just as Mark Twain once wrote that a person is no more harmlessly occupie d than when he is making money, it would seem that Americans believe that a politician is no more harmlessly occupied than when running for election or reelection . As a consequence largely of the abuses of patronage, U .S . state constitutions require not only that the office o f governor and seats in the legislature be filled by direct election, but also that a wide variety o f other state-wide offices be filled in the same way rather than by appointment --offices such a s lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, attorney general, superintendent of schools , secretary of agriculture, commissioner of insurance, highway commissioner, commissioner o f labor, commissioner of elections, and state auditor . The second benefit of filling a multiplicity of local and state offices by direct election is a somewhat paradoxical one : it strengthens national parties and integrates them with local an d regional ones . It might seem that regional elections would only encourage the rise of regiona l parties and political elites who would act in competition with the national government an d who, for their own purposes, would raise issues that would threaten political stability . This i s sometimes true, but primarily in countries in which regional competition focuses on a singl e salient office such as governor . Consider, though, the candidate for local judge in New Yor k City, who, during one of Roosevelt's presidential campaigns, gave his campaign funds to th e local Democratic party in anticipation of professional assistance (Lubell 1952) . Weeks went by , but he saw nothing --no posters or radio broadcasts that mentioned his name! Agitated an d uneasy, he returned to party headquarters to complain . The head of the party took him to th e southern tip of Manhattan where the ferry from Staten Island landed, and, as a ferry pulled in .
he pointed to the floating debris and garbage that swirled at the ferry's stern, towed by it s 1 4 wake, and said the name of your ferry is Franklin Delano Roosevelt ." Thus, in an election i n which voters confront scores of candidates about whom they know little or nothing, the essential commodity possessed by candidates is their partisan labels and the fact that thes e labels are shared by viable candidates for national office . Extensive application of direc t election at the local and state level, then, gives party leaders a valuable commodity with whic h to deal --the party's nomination and official sanction --which, in turn, gives those leaders a n incentive to integrate their party with the national one . Moreover, as described in virtuall y every textbook, the connection works in the other direction as well . While the name Roosevel t and the label "Democrat" doubtlessly helped the local candidate for judge and countless other Democratic candidates for office, the organizations erected to nominate and facilitate local an d state elections become an essential part of any national candidate's campaign . Thus, in a symbiotic relationship like those found in nature (e .g., between cleaner fish, labroides dimidiatus, and groupers, epinephelus striatus), local and national parties rely on each othe r for their survival and success . It is, then, the combination of constitutional provisions --those dealing explicitly wit h federal relations, those that concern the authority of the separate chambers of the nationa l legislature and the basis of representation in them, and those that treat directly or indirectly th e political structure of regional and local governments --that determine a constitution's influence on the nature of the federalism that will prevail in a country .
Whither Russia ?
The circumstances that confront a modern-day Russian Madison or Hamilton are radicall y different from those that characterized the United States in 1787 . As we note in ou r introduction, with the possible exception of its ethnic republics, Russia does not have federa l subjects that possess anything approximating the authority enjoyed by American states today o r in the past . Those who seek a viable Russian federalism, then, are not concerned wit h empowering the national government, but instead must be concerned with empowering regiona l governments without opening the door to a Pandora's box of centrifugal forces . This is a daunting task. Although Russia's new constitution proclaims both democracy and federalism, a significant number of provisions bring into question the definition of democratic federalism tha t the drafters of that document had in mind . The under-development of regional and local selfgovernment and of a democratic political culture in general, can only be further suppressed b y these provisions of the Moscow-produced constitution :
